If ever a single exchange encapsulated the differences between Republicans and anti-Bush Democrats on issues of leadership and the War on Terror, it is this one between Condi Rice and George Stephanopoulos on ABC’s “This Week”:
STEPHANOPOULOS: And Senator Kerry’s going to keep on making the case that President Bush and your administration were misleading in making the case for war. And The New York Times returns to that question this morning. They say—the question of whether or not you were straightforward when describing Saddam Hussein’s weapons program. They have an exhaustive, 10,000-word article on the debate whether aluminum tubes were being imported, were for nuclear weapons or artillery rockets.
Here’s what you said about that on September 8, 2002, on CNN in the run-up to the war.
[BEGIN VIDEO CLIP]
RICE: We do know that there have been shipments going into Iran, for instance—into Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to—high-quality aluminum tubes that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs.
[END VIDEO CLIP]
STEPHANOPOULOS: But The New York Times writes this morning that Almost a year before, Ms. Rice’s staff had been told that the government’s foremost nuclear experts seriously doubted that the tubes were for nuclear weapons according to four officials at the Central Intelligence Agency and two senior administration officials. The experts at the Energy Department believe the tubes were likely intended for small artillery rockets. If the government’s top nuclear experts doubted that they were for nuclear weapons, why did you say that they were only suited for nuclear weapons?
RICE: George, at the time, I knew that there was a dispute. I actually didn’t really know the nature of the dispute. We learned that—I learned that later, as the NIE was being produced, and that the Department of Energy had reservations about what these tubes were for.
There were other people, of course, people, for instance, who did rocket launchers, who said that they thought they were unlikely to be for rocket launchers.
So what you had was a debate within the intelligence community.
STEPHANOPOULOS: But according to this article, that debate had been going on for more than a year, all through 2001. The State Department had weighed in on the side of the Energy Department, British intelligence had weighed in, Australian intelligence had said that the idea that the tubes were for nukes was patchy and inconclusive.
RICE: Unfortunately, George, the intelligence community assessment as a whole was that these were likely and certainly suitable for and likely for his nuclear weapons program, for a number of other reasons.
STEPHANOPOULOS: … the CIA’s, and they were saying…
RICE: Well…
STEPHANOPOULOS: … the nuclear weapons, not only for nuclear weapons.
RICE: Well, the director of Central Intelligence believed that the centrifuge part for these tubes, which were for centrifuge parts, were a part of a procurement effort for a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. Now, I’ll point out that the Department of Energy, of course, joined in the assessment that Saddam Hussein was reconstituting his nuclear weapons program.
STEPHANOPOULOS: But that was separate from their judgment about these aluminum tubes.
RICE: But George, the tubes were alongside a lot of other evidence about experts being kept together, about balancing equipment being brought in, about how these procurement efforts were being funded.
When you’re a policy-maker, you’re sitting there looking at assessments that say that Saddam Hussein is reconstituting his nuclear weapons program. That’s the key judgment. Secondly, that he can have a nuclear weapon likely by the end of the decade if something is not done about his program.
Those are assessments that cannot be ignored…
STEPHANOPOULOS: But that conclusion was based in part on faulty evidence…
RICE: George…
STEPHANOPOULOS: … on the aluminum tubes.
RICE: George, what we knew at the time, what we knew at the time, was that there was, yes, a dispute in the intelligence agency about this. And, by the way, knew later, as the NIE came out, that there was a dispute within the intelligence agencies about this, but that there was dispute only by one agency, that’s the State Department, about his…
STEPHANOPOULOS: Not the Energy Department?
RICE: No, the Energy Department said he was reconstituting his nuclear weapons program. And when you are a policy-maker…
STEPHANOPOULOS: But wait a second. They also said they believed that the tubes were for rockets, not for nuclear weapons.
RICE: George, when you are faced with an assessment that Saddam Hussein is reconstituting his nuclear weapons program, that he has, by the end of the decade, the probability of having a nuclear weapon, when you know that the intelligence agencies tend to underestimate these things—after all, missing the Indian nuclear test in 1991—when the IAEA actually got there after the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein was much closer to a nuclear weapon than anybody had thought, the tendency is always not to want to underestimate these programs.
And that is, by the way, a methodology that I would stand by to today.
STEPHANOPOULOS: Was…
RICE: A policy-maker cannot afford to be wrong on the short side, underestimating the ability of a tyrant like Saddam Hussein, who had expertise, who had weapons of mass destruction and had used them in the past, and who kept a very strong intent to keep those programs in place…
STEPHANOPOULOS: Well, then, today…
RICE: … you can’t afford to underestimate that.
STEPHANOPOULOS: Today, then, you know, the weapons inspectors have found no evidence of centrifuges. Do you now accept that these aluminum tubes were almost certainly for artillery rockets, not nuclear weapons?
RICE: George, the fact is that what you know today can affect what you do tomorrow, but not what you did yesterday.
STEPHANOPOULOS: Well, I’m asking about today.
RICE: … I stand by to this day the correctness of the decision to take seriously an intelligence assessment that Saddam Hussein would likely have a nuclear weapon by the end of the decade if you didn’t do something. The assessment of the intelligence community as a whole, and the director of Central Intelligence, that he was reconstituting his nuclear program, that he had biological and chemical weapons, if you put that in the context of a dangerous man in the world’s most dangerous region, in whom…
STEPHANOPOULOS: I know, but that’s…
RICE: … still in a state of suspended hostility…
STEPHANOPOULOS: That’s not precisely what I’m asking. Do you accept today that these tubes were likely for rockets, not nuclear weapons?
RICE: George, as I understand it, people are still debating this. And I’m sure they will continue to debate it.
But whatever the case there, I stand by the decision to go to war against Saddam Hussein and remove this threat to American security, this threat to the Middle East, this thorn in the side of any effort to build a different kind of Middle East.
When you’re a policy-maker, yes, you can try and you can get ground down in the details of this debate versus that debate. But you have to keep your eye on the most important assessment. And that was Saddam Hussein a threat? Of course he was a threat.
And anyone who believes that the world was better with a false sense of stability with this dictator in power than we are now, with an opportunity to build a different kind of Iraq as a linchpin for a different kind of Middle East, really isn’t making a good judgment.
In Rice’s view, the administration played the odds and went offensive against a dangerous tyrant, in the process preventing a growing threat from becoming an imminent one. In Stephanoupolos’s (liberal Democratic) view, everything becomes clear only in hindsight, which thinking inevitably favors a culture of risk-aversion and defense—the precise wrong way to fight a global terrorist threat. Viewed through this prism, John Kerry’s recent pronouncement that the wisdom of the Iraq war ultimately “depends on the outcome”, is hardly surprising—though still quite remarkable to hear uttered aloud by anyone hoping to lead our country in a time of war.
Is it too much to ask that the Democrats even admit to being in a war. I mean the current one.
The exchange is also a perfect example of the legalistic mindset of the Democratic party. The broader issue of whether Sadaam was working towards developing nuclear weapons is less important, in Stephanoupolos’s mind, to the micro-issue of whether these particular aluminum tubes could only have been used towards developing nuclear weapons. The beyond-reasonable-doubt standard has no place when the issue is national security.
Actually, I was cool with the ‘depends on the outcome’ thing from Kerry in the GMA interview. Since John Kerry is capable of time travel and can grok all future outcomes of all decisions he will make (I say will make, since, um, he actually hasn’t MADE a policy decision yet).
Yes, this twink scares me.
Here’s my question: Has Stephanopoulous ever been seen in the same place as your deadbeat neighbor, Jeff?
No. But my neighbor is about 2’ taller than laddy George.
So’s my neighbor’s third grader.
Jeremy makes a good point, though. Georgie keeps arguing like an defense attorney trying to raise doubt with a jury about other possible uses of the tubes. Heaven help the friggin’ Dems be worried about the one use, i.e., enrichment, that could lead to weapons grade material. No, they’re too busy trying to discredit the administration.
But, sure, they’re strong on national defence.
Please.
I kept waiting for her to say: “Look, you diminutive semi-gay-hair-dresser-looking (not that there’s anything wrong with that) snot-nosed pundit! The only thing you and your kind ever have to do is talk, talk, talk, but in MY world, in which I am an extremely POWERFUL WOMAN, ACTION must be taken! And so ACTION IS TAKEN, sometimes on the basis of information that is not 100% perfect. Now shut your cute little mouth and bring mama another espressso. Can you do anything about this hair . . . ?”
Truly Goldstein…uh, Goldsteinian, Sharkman.
Can you do anything about this hair…bitch.?
Kelly: I had Aretha Franklin’s voice speaking that quote in my head as I was typing it (try it, you’ll crack up) and I just couldn’t see her saying “bitch” though of course it would definitely apply in Georgie’s case.
And I hope it isn’t racist to replace Condi’s voice with Aretha’s voice while typing a cool quote. I’m sure I’ll get hammered by further comments!
I don’t believe that the Stephenopolous – or most partisan democrats are stupid enough to believe what they’re saying, they’re just dishonest enough to think that much of the public is stupid enough to believe such a line, so they push it.
I’m voting for a Republican for the first time in my life this year, and if the democrats keep showing this sort of disloyal, dishonest partisanship I’m going to reregister as a Republican.
Joshua Scholar: Welcome to the fold.
We Will welcome you from the dark side Joshua!
Sharkman, I was really thinking along the same lines as I was watching that. Yours was very funny though. but really, I wanted her to say “Guess what? I am the NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, get that word…SECURITY. When I am looking at evidence that suggests that a madman dictator has weapons of this magnitude, then yes, I am going to go with SECURITY. What would you have done George? Ignored it and wished for the best? Hoped against hope that he didn’t have them? This madman wasn’t going away and he had 2 demented dictators in waiting. You and the rest of the democrats need to snag some of Kerry’s vast wealth and buy a clue”
Couple questions. Answer at your own risk/pleasure.
Why is a 10,000 word article in the NYTimes definitive on any issue involving Iraq? (Only to those that see the NYTimes as not sufficiently liberal, is there similarily an absence of anti-Bush bias.)
Will anyone, including the NYTimes, who claims the aluminum tubes were for missiles, please state the applicable missile system. Such a claim requires knowledge regarding the design specifications and capabilites of such a weapon. These specifications would include capabilities that limited the missile range to less than 150 km, otherwise such missile, by definition, is prohibited. As well, such missiles need to be incapable of using NBC materials as warheads, otherwise such missiles would be a prohibited delivery system under the terms of the 1991 cease fire agreement.
Tubes as missiles is the big lie that keeps getting repeated.
George is dishonest because he plays this shell game that requires disproving that which hasn’t been proven–tubes as missiles. (His approach is up there with the famous “when did you stop beating your wife” question.)
It is common knowledge that Hussein bought and used material that was “dual-use.” That he didn’t have a reconstituted nuclear program does not mean he did not have a desire for one and would not have rebuilt it first chance he got. These very same people would have hanged George Bush on the Rose Garden if New York became a radioactive hole in the ground because Bush hadn’t acted.
Yeah, Joshua. I’m in the same boat, but maybe I have been in it longer. I will remain a Democrat until the day after the election, to register my “protest” vote, and then I’ll be a Republican. I will never, never, forgive Kerry and Kennedy and Pelosi and Rather and the rest of the Democrats and the leftist media for their betrayal of this country in a time of war. They make me sick. It makes me sicker to think I once supported them and their ilk.
Since its long been obvious that Stephanopoulis is a hypocrite, I’m betting Stephanopoulis has not made any public comment condemning Dan Rather’s use of forged memos.
I’d also put out that Clinton’s little midget was full of shit regarding the centrifuge question.
There actually is evidence of centrifuges.
Has Steffy boy not read the numerous stories regarding the centrifuge parts that Saddam ordered Mahdi Obeidi to bury in his backyard?
Does he think he was the only Iraqi nuclear scientiest hiding equipment and plans?
what a load of crap.
I’m a little confused about little Stephie’s comments on these tubes. He seems to have missed the point of the whole “dual use” designation. Forgive me if I provide a little more tedious detail than some might like, for in the day job I work with materials that are dual use (sometimes).
Where a material CAN be used (please note, not where a material WILL be so used) for the production of nuclear weapons or in the process of enrichment (whether for civilian or military purposes) there are a number of hoops that you must jump through. These are set by the IAEA with the support of most governments. For example, we shipped some hafnium oxide to Russia a few months ago. Depending upon the level of zirconium as a contaminant in that material (boring technical reasons to do with transparency to neutrons) it can or cannot be used to make control rods for nuclear power plants. Notwithstanding the fact that Russia produces its own hafnium oxide, and that we were going to get it processed and bring it back to the US, we had to swear that it was not going into the nuclear industry. And if it did, whether we were complicit or we were fooled, I get to go to jail for up to 20 years. That is how the rules on “dual use” items work.
There was a case just after Gulf I where an executive for Teledyne Wah Chang went to the Federal pen for 3 years. They had sold some zirconium powder to Chile. Got the export licence, everything was cool. Zr powder is another dual use item, it can be used to make initiators for airbags and also for the secondary initiators for artillery and other munitions. After G I, troops in Iraq found that some of this Zr powder had been used by the Chileans to make initiators for munitions then sold to Iraq. So that exec in charge went to jail. He had the licences, he had the sworn deposition of the Chileans that they would be good boys, doesn’t matter. Off he goes to make close friends with his cellmate.
The way that the entire dual use program works, whether it is about military or nuclear materials, is that the presumption is on the supplier to show that it is NOT for the dangerous use. If I want to ship zircalloy tubes (used as the tubes that nuclear fuels go into, but also in certain types of chemicals plants) then I have to show the plans for the chemical plant and also make dman sure that that is exactly where they go. If they end up in a nuclear plant then I’m off to make bum-chums for a few years.
That is the way it works and that is why Stephie is simply wrong in his conversation with Condi. It doesn’t matter whether these highly pure aluminum tubes were actually going to be used in rockets rather than centrifuges. Because they can be used in centrifuges they are assumed to be so until proven otherwise. Both de facto and de jure.
What they were used for is irrelevant. What they could be used for is the test.
The tubes! Only now do I see my folly. Bush should’ve known that some experts disputed whether or not some aluminum tubes were going to be used for a nuclear program or not. He should’ve seen through the lies promoted by the Director of the CIA and the intelligence community at large that Saddam wanted to reconstitute his weapons programs and based his decision on that one thing. The tubes! (*Smacks head*) Of course!
Was a good segment. Georgie was all primed and ready to crow following the ‘Bush Lied!’ theme, and although it doesn’t come through in the transcript, Condi had him grovelling on the floor and begging to lick the bottom of her shoe till the gum came off.
If my nipples were as reactive as Jeff’s, I’m thinking diamonds wouldn’t be safe.