Tom Maguire, Jeralyn Merritt, and Arianna Huffington (among others) have done yeoman’s work covering the Plamegate story in all its intricate prosecutorial, grand jury, and media permutations, and soon—thankfully—Patrick Fitzgerald should let us all know what provisional conclusions his long investigation has yielded. But in advance of that, let’s not forget the chain of events that brought us to this point—beginning with an October 15, 2001 CIA foreign government service report that the Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime had sruck a deal with the government of Niger to purchase several tons of partially processed uranium (“yellowcake”), followed soon by a February 18 2002 report from the US embassy in Niger describing a new account of the alleged deal, and—after Joseph Wilson’s factfinding trip—a September 2002 DIA paper titled Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Program.
The Weekly Standard’s Stephen Hayes covers it all in a fascinating piece, “The White House, the CIA, and the Wilsons”:
Reactions to the report differed. The INR analyst believed Wilson’s report supported his assessment that deals between Iraq and Niger were unlikely. Analysts at the CIA thought the Wilson report added little to the overall knowledge of the Iraq-Niger allegations but noted with particular interest the visit of the Iraqi delegation in 1999. That report may have seemed noteworthy because of the timing of the Iraqi visit. The CIA had several previous reports of Iraq seeking uranium in Africa in 1999, specifically from Congo and Somalia.
On balance, then, Wilson’s trip seemed to several analysts to make the original claims of an Iraq-Niger deal more plausible.
Throughout the spring and summer, finished intelligence products from several U.S. intelligence agencies cited the reporting on Iraq and Niger as evidence that the Iraqis were continuing their pursuit of nuclear weapons. Some of these noted the doubts of the skeptics, while others were more aggressive in their analysis. A September 2002 DIA paper, for instance, was titled Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Program. It declared: “Iraq has been vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake.”
THE WHITE HOUSE began to take its case against Iraq to the American public beginning in the late summer of 2002. Vice President Cheney warned of the threat from Iraq in a stern speech in Nashville on August 26. Behind the scenes at the White House, communications officials developed talking points and fact sheets for administration officials and their surrogates. Most of these included the Iraq-Niger intelligence, and all of them were cleared by the CIA.
The CIA also cleared several references to the Iraq-Niger intelligence–some more direct than others–for use in speeches written for President Bush. This language was cleared by the CIA on September 11, 2002:
We also know this: within the past few years, Iraq has resumed efforts to purchase large quantities of a type of uranium oxide known as yellowcake, which is an essential ingredient in this [enrichment] process. The regime was caught trying to purchase 500 metric tons of this material. It takes about 10 tons to produce enough enriched uranium for a single nuclear weapon.
Although Bush spoke the following day at the United Nations, he did not use the CIA-approved language.
The first public mention of the intelligence reporting on Iraq and Niger came on September 24, 2002, in a white paper produced by the British government. “There is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” The CIA had reservations about the British dossier, but not because of its substance. Despite the fact that the British paper did not link the intelligence to Niger, officials at the CIA were concerned that the reference could compromise the source that had provided the intelligence.
That same day, September 24, staffers at the National Security Council (NSC) asked the CIA to clear additional language on Iraq and Niger. “We also have intelligence that Iraq has sought large amounts of uranium and uranium oxide, known as yellowcake, from Africa. Yellowcake is an essential ingredient in the process to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.” The CIA once again approved the language, but once again the president did not use it.
The Senate Select Intelligence Committee met on October 2, 2002, and questioned senior U.S. intelligence officials in closed session about the threat from Iraq. Here, for the first time, a senior CIA official raised doubts about the reporting on Iraq and Niger. Responding to a question from Senator Jon Kyl, who asked if there was anything in the British white paper that the CIA disputed, deputy CIA director John McLaughlin said this:
The one thing where I think they stretched a little bit beyond where we would stretch is on the points about Iraq seeking uranium from various African locations. We’ve looked at those reports and we don’t think they are very credible. It doesn’t diminish our conviction that he’s going for nuclear weapons, but I think they reached a little bit on that one point.
It was a strange claim, and it provides a first glimpse of the internal confusion at the CIA on the issue of Iraq and Niger. One day earlier, on October 1, 2002, the CIA had published the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraqi WMD, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction. This classified document–the U.S. government’s official position on Iraqi WMD programs–lifted almost verbatim the aggressive language used in the aforementioned DIA study, Iraq’s Reemerging Nuclear Program, published just two weeks earlier: “Iraq [has been] vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons.”
The National Intelligence Estimate continued: “A foreign government service reported that as of early 2001, Niger planned to send several tons of ‘pure uranium’ (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As of early 2001, Iraq and Niger reportedly were still working out arrangements for this deal, which would be for up to 500 tons of yellowcake. We do not know the status of this arrangement.” The NIE included a bullet point about other intelligence on Iraq’s pursuit of uranium. “Reports indicate Iraq has also sought uranium ore from Somalia and possibly the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” The INR objections to the Iraq-Niger intelligence were included but, because of an editing glitch, were placed some 60 pages away from the consensus view.
Meanwhile, the Bush administration continued its public relations campaign to demonstrate that Saddam Hussein was a threat. The White House was finalizing the text of a speech the president was scheduled to deliver in Cincinnati on October 7, 2002, on the eve of the congressional vote to authorize the use of force against Iraq. The speechwriters continued their regular back and forth with the CIA for clearance of potentially sensitive language. On draft six of the speech, the CIA objected to this sentence: “The [Iraqi] regime has been caught attempting to purchase up to 500 metric tons of uranium oxide from Africa–an essential ingredient in the enrichment process.”
Had something changed? The National Intelligence Estimate published just three days earlier included language as aggressive as the language proposed for the Cincinnati speech. Was it a matter of classification? The NIE was classified, while the language in the speech was meant for public consumption. And the CIA had been nervous about the British white paper. Still, twice in September the CIA had cleared similar language for a presidential address.
A longish piece, but it provides some lost perspective on this entire story, which, as Hayes points out, is becoming increasingly ossified into a narrative that many of those early, forgotten facts dispute.
Read the whole thing.
With respect to Wilson himself, it remains relevant that his wife was involved in the decision to send him to Niger.
And it remains relevant that Wilson himself, and his wife Plame, chose to politicize his involvement with a fundamentally dishonest series of speeches and oped pieces that were anti-Bush administration.
I had either never known (or had forgotten about) just how much the CIA had agreed with, and just how minor (and dubious) were their complaints concerning the way the information was being presented to the public.
If this Plame thing ends in indictments, I would hope that we turn our attention to the establishment leakers in CIA and State Department next. They are almost entirely anti-Executive branch, and they have been particulary hostile to Bush and his foreign policy.
… turn our attention to the establishment leakers in CIA and State Department next.
That’s what Condi and Goss are doing as we speak.
Make it stop! This has got to be one of the most boring scandals-if you can call it that-ever. I mean, no sex, no drugs, no death or destruction, nothing even remotely interesting. Much like the DeLay thing, given the limited info I’ve gleaned, I don’t even see a crime. At most it was unethical politicking. And boring, regardless of its legality. Anything to hurt Rethuglicans, eh? I thought the whole Gay Porn Cock of Lies thing was at least funny enough to warrant all the press attention.
There would be one silver lining to an indictment of Libby or Rove. Getting the various reporters who have told inconsistent public versions on to the witness stand and under cross examination.
In fact, getting Joe Wilson and Valerie Plame under cross examination would be a huge amusement.
I still can’t get my mind around a covert agent driving to Foggy Bottom everyday to work.
Robin – It’s also relevant that it may have been Wilson himself who actually first told a reporter that Plame was a covert agent. Novak, Rove, and Libby all seem to have thought/assumed that she was an overt CIA employee.
If Rove or Libby get indicted, I will lose all respect for the “great political mind”, whomever it may belong to. This whole thing is your basic “tempest in a teapot”. No way those guys could be so stupid as to perjure themselves.
DAMN YOU, JEFF!!!!!
I have so much respect for your blogging, from your powers of reasoning, to your intellect, to your linguistic prowess, that I’m quite certain that this is yet another profoundly compelling piece–
But now, thanks to your clever title for this post, I CAN’T GET THAT DAMNED BANANARAMA SONG OUT OF MY HEAD LONG ENOUGH TO CONCENTRATE!!!
Sheesh–guess I’ll try again in the morning.
BoDiddly,
Wanna try the band name again?
Jeff,
I couldn’t agree with your statement
If anyone in this squalid little affair ought to be indicted it is the blowhard Wilson, followed closely by the establishment leakers.
It amazes me that this story has continued as long as it has. It only drops off of the radar when there is something better to bash Bush with, like ‘Mother’ Sheehan or the hysterical Katrina coverage.
Far more interesting, yet with virtually no coverage or just enough coverage to laugh it off, is Sandy Berger stuffing his pants full of classified documents, taking them out of a secure area and later destroying them, curiously enough during the same period that Clinton testified in front of the 9/11 commission. Additionally, Berger’s actions seem even more curious in light of the Able Danger story.
However, none of this is newsworthy. I can only imagine the media frenzy if Rove had done that.
Oops! I meant to say “I couldn’t agree more with your statement.”
This is for BoDiddly. It’ll help get that song out…scout’s honor.
Damn–the Bangles–the other incredibly annoying-yet-catchy “B” band of the late 80s…
Oh, and SeanH, you’re one sadistic bastard.
TW:began
I began to realize just how bad that song irks me when it messed with my 80s music memory.
Would you prefer the Bangles version of “Hazy Shade of Winter”? I know I do.
Trivia: they cut the line about “vodka and limes” out of the song, so reportedly they sent Paul Simon some vodka and limes to make up for it.
I just read this piece last night and it cleared up alot of really bad “reporting” on this matter. The fact that Stephen Hayes gets his info from the Senate report makes it hard to argue, as opposed to Wilson’s version that the msm keeps yammering on about.
The Plame-Story has a reeking pedigree.
And consider who gained from this “caper.” To Saddam’s patrons, “anti-war” groups, and U.N.-ophiles, John Kerry’s campaign, and the Left-wing moonbats, the political smoke this tactic produced was a boon. “Bush Lied.” “No WMD’s.” “Cowboy Unilateralism.” “Global Test.” All these logos gained rhetorical succor from this simple fraud.
I have one question. Is it treason to undermine your nation’s government in its preparation for conflict with an avowed, militaristic enemy?
-Steve
Susanna Hoffs was HoT!
“A longish piece, but it provides some lost perspective on this entire story, which, as Hayes points out, is becoming increasingly ossified into a narrative that many of those early, forgotten facts dispute.”
Whats the perspective? that if you are an intelligence asset, the woman under cover you are be talking to may be revealed in the future, if it turns out her husband is an obstacle to war?
Whats the perspective? that if you are an intelligence asset, the woman under cover you are be talking to may be revealed in the future, if it turns out her husband is an obstacle to war?
WTF?
the perspective not is. the protein wisdom commenter who are typing to be, it turns out is be were a moron
Thanks, Matt. That clears it up for me.
Well, you have to actually read it, actus. It’s not going to email you over talking points like Moveon.org does.
“Well, you have to actually read it, actus. “
Its about a lot of stuff having to do with Joe Wilson. Why is that perspective on leaking Plame’s status?
Fine, don’t read the whole thing. I don’t care.