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a post in which I answer a purported constitutional expert with what I imagine to be a better constitutional expert, making short work of an argument I've in other circumstances critiqued with far more immediacy and rigor

Dr Leon Friedman, professor of law, Hofstra, writing at the Huffington Post:

Of course, Congress must rely on the specific words of the Constitution as a basis for any legislation, as the Republicans and the Tea Party insists. But those broad words — “general welfare” “regulate commerce” — must be read in accordance with the economic reality of our time, not the time in which the Constitution was ratified. The Supreme Court correctly expanded the reach of the Commerce Clause in the late 1930’s in order to uphold many provisions of the New Deal in the 1930s to meet the problems of the great depression. The Court followed the words of Chief Justice John Marshall in McCullogh v. Maryland: “[l]et the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”

Today’s federal courts should follow the same path and uphold legislation like the Obama health care law that correct problems having a serious impact on our nation’s economy and do effect “Commerce… among the several states”.

The ideologically-driven notion that we cannot let Congress pass laws unless we can link them to specific language in the Constitution that must be as narrowly defined as possible must be rejected.

protein wisdom, intentionalist, borrowing from James Madison, Constitutional author:

I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the nation. In that sense alone it is the legitimate Constitution. And if that is not the guide in expounding it, there may be no security for a consistent and stable, more than for a faithful exercise of its powers. If the meaning of the text be sought in the changeable meaning of the words composing it, it is evident that the shape and attributes of the Government must partake of the changes to which the words and phrases of all living languages are constantly subject. What a metamorphosis would be produced in the code of law if all its ancient phraseology were to be taken in its modern sense.

[my emphases]

Insofar as it purports to reject legislative intent and concentrate its efforts instead on what it then claims is the “plain meaning” of the signifiers it will, in every new context, try to signify afresh, textualism provides the backdoor entry into legitimating the idea of a Living Constitution Friedman herein advocates. Naturally, sometimes this signification will appeal to originary intent, particularly in those instances wherein that intent matches up to desires of the interpreter for that interpretation to obtain (thus granting it a kind of extra authority); but the catch is, such an appeal is not mandatory, based on the linguistic premises that underlie textualism: once we allow that original intent is not as a rule binding, we tacitly proclaim that the intent of the receiver is ascendant (though we use precedent to try to rein in the more aggressive re-imaginings in the short term while creating ever new texts to manipulate in the longer term to justify oftentimes complete inversions of original meaning).

Intentionalism — which observes that for language to be language it must do more than merely look like language; and notes as a consequence that where we establish the locus of signification as a rule will determine who we allow to control the text’s meaning — is the linguistic truism that guards against the theft of meaning by the will to power of dedicated interpretive communities. If we let it.

By “democratizing” meaning — as the left has sought to do — has perforce robbed the utterer of his ability to mean what he meant as a rule over time; and so allow sophists like Dr Friedman to pretend that what that utterer meant in the past need not constrain what the new situatedness of the Constitution allows that meaning to be today.

Which way of usurping the hermeneutic latitude to do what you wish does away with the messy and difficult problem of changing the Constitution through Constitutional amendments and the like, you have to admit.

But of course, these kinds of observations are “fundamentally unserious,” as some on the right have noted (how does any of this stuff help get Mitch Daniels elected?, eg.) so I offer them only in case someday someone can find a use for them.

13 Replies to “a post in which I answer a purported constitutional expert with what I imagine to be a better constitutional expert, making short work of an argument I've in other circumstances critiqued with far more immediacy and rigor”

  1. Squid says:

    Wow. That column is just embarrassingly bad. Or would be, if Hofstra professors had the capacity for embarrassment.

    Dude spends several paragraphs setting up the historical tensions revolving around empowering an army that can defend the nation without enslaving it, and to what end does he take all this setup? Rather than extending the metaphor to cover federal regulatory and tax powers, and the need to limit those federal powers in the way that military power is limited, he simply waves his hand, dismisses half the arguments he cited, and says, “See? We totally need socialized medicine!”

    That’s just shallow and sad, even for a ConLaw professor; even for a ConLaw professor on HuffPo.

  2. newrouter says:

    The Supreme Court correctly expanded the reach of the Commerce Clause in the late 1930?s

    after attempts to pack the court failed

  3. LTC John says:

    “Dr Leon Friedman, professor of law, Hofstra”

    Don’t like what the Constitution says currently? Amend it. Idiot.

  4. Joe says:

    The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

    That language seems pretty explicit. Sad when I am agreeing with Ruth Bader Ginsberg over an 8:1 decision. And while Daniels would not be the first GOP executive disappointed by a judicial pick, I would like to see him at least express a statement that he is disappointed.

    http://www.theagitator.com/2011/05/16/warrant-we-dont-need-no-stinkin-warrant/

  5. Bob Reed says:

    The Supreme Court correctly expanded the reach of the Commerce Clause in the late 1930?s in order to uphold many provisions of the New Deal in the 1930s to meet the problems of the great depression, capitulating in the face of FDR’s threats to pack the Supreme Court in his favor as well as knucking under to what they saw as expediancies to head off a bolshevik-like revolution here in America.

    FTFY Friedman…

    That guy is a disgrace to academia and the legal profession. He contradicts one of the authors of the Constitution even when he’s not personally fit to tie Madison’s shoes…

    Friedman? Penumbras, emanating…

    Madison, as JeffG quoted?

    What a metamorphosis would be produced in the code of law if all its ancient phraseology were to be taken in its modern sense.

    So I ask you, who’s word carries more weight, vis-a-vis the intent of the Constitutional authors? Who better knows what they’re talking about?

    Just how “living” is the Constitution, outside it’s ability to be amended of course?

  6. Joe says:

    “If you think aficionados of a living Constitution want to bring you flexibility, think again,” Scalia told an audience at the Woodrow Wilson Center, a Washington think tank. “You think the death penalty is a good idea? Persuade your fellow citizens to adopt it. You want a right to abortion? Persuade your fellow citizens and enact it. That’s flexibility.”

    “Why in the world would you have it interpreted by nine lawyers?” he said.

    http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,150428,00.html

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=imYlSD-2mrk

  7. I am adding Marshall to the list of my Time Machine Hit Squad targets.

  8. dicentra says:

    Just how “living” is the Constitution, outside its ability to be amended of course?

    As living as they need it to be.

  9. Spiny Norman says:

    The problem is that Progressives treat the so-called “living Constitution” as a reanimated corpse.

  10. geoffb says:

    From the introduction pages 7-9 of “How the Progressives Rewrote the Constitution” by Richard A. Epstein

    The Progressive view of social progress equated active government with good government. Predictably, their theory of good government generated a compatible constitutional theory. Thus, any constitutional doctrine that stood in the way of comprehensive reforms had to be rejected or circumvented.

    The Progressive program was deeply dismissive of the “individualist” ethic that Progressives believed shaped traditional social attitudes toward the transformation of social life. In consequence, they thought that it was necessary to undermine in two distinct areas traditional legal conceptions rooted in that bygone ethic. The first of these concerned the structure of American federalism, in which a national government of enumerated powers had a few defined tasks, with all else, including the regulation of economic activity, left largely to the states. The second had to do with the protection of individual liberty that dominated the judicial thinking of the time-chiefly the liberty of entering into voluntary contracts with whomever one pleased, and only with such people.
    […]
    The struggle between Progressives and traditionalists took place on both a functional and a textual level. Before that struggle can be examined in any depth, however, it is necessary to deal with a few preliminaries on constitutional theory. The first point has to do with the uses and limits of constitutional textualism. Any sensible theory of constitutional law must take the key terms in a document and give them the meaning that ordinary users would have attached to them when the provisions were drafted. It is usually dangerous business to put a modern gloss on a traditional term.

    By the same token, however, it must be understood that this textual enterprise is only the first stage of the larger business of constitutional interpretation. Many of the key questions of constitutional law have to do with the articulation of doctrines that have no particular textual origin, but whose inclusion is fairly required by the text itself. As becomes clear later, the proper rendering of the police power — the ability of the state to act to advance health, safety, morals, or the general welfare is one of the critical elements of constitutional law. Yet the term “police power” itself (or any of its variants) appears nowhere in the constitution. Still, so long as the articulation of legal rules is regarded as a process of successive qualifications of some basic principle-as has long been the case-then this task is part of the constitutional inquiry.

  11. mojo says:

    ‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’

    ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’

    ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master — that’s all.’

  12. Pablo says:

    So I ask you, who’s word carries more weight, vis-a-vis the intent of the Constitutional authors? Who better knows what they’re talking about?

    Bob, Madison wrote that like a hundred years ago, and he’s kind of confusing so nobody really knows what he meant. Let’s just leave it to our betters to figure out what’s best for us.

  13. B. Moe says:

    Doesn’t really matter what Madison thought anyway, Pablo. I had a lawyer explain to me awhile back that the Constitution obviously wouldn’t have meant the same thing to everyone who signed it, and that every signers opinion carried just as much weight as the actual authors.

    This was a dude who actually works drafting legislation on the state level, he explained how legislation drafted in committee is a compromise and the wording often means different things to the different people involved. He stopped responding when I asked if he felt guilty charging so much money to write meaningless bullshit.

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