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Yawn, chapter 2

Wait, you mean Dick Clarke lied…? Are you sure? Because he seemed so earnest. And then there was that sonorous, blue-suited apology to the nation. Don’t get me started on that — I still get teary eyed.

Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz. And Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz.

14 Replies to “Yawn, chapter 2”

  1. Y’know, before linking to my work, it always helps to read the entire post.

    Because the upshot, of course, was that Rice’s characterization was false as well:

    So Rice is technically correct. But her “context” for the case omits the bigger picture—which tends, in fact, to corroborate Clarke’s version, and moreover paints Rice and her Team Bush cohorts in a decidedly incompetent light.

    The bigger picture includes what happened next: Namely, FBI agents and the Clinton counterterror team, headed by Clarke—realizing the enormity of what Ressam represented—sprung quickly into action and soon uncovered most of the rest of his co-conspirators. Ressam, it must be remembered, was scheduled to bomb L.A. International Airport. However, there were at least three other millennium plots, all outside the U.S. but against mostly American targets. (As far as I know, the speculation that the Space Needle was targeted has been mostly discredited.) More to the point, investigators began uncovering a much broader assortment of Al Qaeda terrorist cells operating within the U.S.

  2. Jeff G says:

    With all due respect, David, that’s the bigger picture you’d like to paint.  Me, I should hope that the Clinton counter terrorism people would quickly spring into action after having lucked into nabbing Ressam. Nothing surprising or revelatory there.  That’s their job, afterall.

    But such is not the point of my post.  The point is, Clarke claimed personnel were put on heightened alert. Which is untrue.  From your post:

    I haven’t seen the passages in Clarke’s book yet detailing this matter, but Cole leaves the impression that Ressam was caught because Clarke put border officials on high alert—though this was not in fact the case. In fact, just as Rice asserted today, Ressam was captured primarily through the work of a Customs agent who was simply doing her job as she might normally. (The Seattle Times had a riveting account of the arrest as part of its excellent series on the Ressam case.)

    However, that’s not the entire story, either.

    I checked with Mike Milne, the PIO for Customs in Seattle—which oversees the Port Angeles bureau where Ressam was caught—and he confirmed that there was no “high alert” for his agents in December 1999.

    “There wasn’t such a thing back in those days as elevated alert levels or terrorist-watch kinds of issues within U.S. Customs at that time,” Milne said. “What this was was a case of inspectors just doing their jobs as they normally would[…]”

    You can argue about competence and relative blame subsequent to the capture all you’d like (and you do).  But the fact is, Clarke lied.  That you’re willing to believe his version of events beyond that is your choice.  But for me, he’s lost his credibility.

  3. Well, Jeff, wouldn’t you likewise hope that the Bush administration would also spring into action once it had lucked into nabbing Zacarias Moussaoui? Especially in the midst of an environment in which threat warnings were coming in a steady stream?

  4. Rob says:

    Don’t change the subject, Dave.  Clarke lied, that’s the point of Jeff’s post.

    Moussaoui is another issue.

  5. Jeff G says:

    I believe that the Bush Administration was looking at shifting strategies vis-a-vis combatting terrorism, and that they were as concerned with the terrorist threat as the Clinton administration.  But no one was prepared for 9/11.

  6. Rae says:

    Regardless- Jeff’s post, in typical fashion, was rolickingly, hilariously, sadly true.

  7. Rae says:

    P.S. Jeff- hey sweetheart, can you come see my new place?

  8. BH says:

    Dave, why were we not allowed to more vigorously investigate and take action?

    Church and Deutch.

    Why ignore decades of history?

  9. A couple of points:

    1. Pointing out Rice’s mendacity is entirely to the point, because it is the context of this discussion. Clarke was factually incorrect on a point of detail, but was correct on the larger point (even the Seattle Times piece acknowledges this); Rice, in contrast, appears to have intentionally misled the 9/11 commission by mischaracterizing the nature of the response to the Millennium plot.

    2. Blaming Frank Church for these intelligence failures is almost pathetic, not to mention a gross mischaracterization of the intelligence community’s history of the past 30 years. Chris Mooney <a>thoroughly eviscerated</a> this charge some time back. Blaming Deutsch, likewise, is phony; it’s true that Deutsch didn’t do enough to change the culture of the community, but he certainly didn’t create the conditions.

    The core problem with intelligence that led to 9/11 was its gross bureaucratization in the 1980s, which largely gutted its ability to infiltrate terrorist organizations and gather data from within. Even neocons with backgrounds in intelligence have remarked on this. See, for instance, Reuel Marc Gerecht’s <a>piece in the Atlantic Monthly</a> (published just before 9/11) which goes into this problem in detail. Gerecht, of course, is a fixture of the neocon set.

  10. Jeff G says:

    1) I disagree with your premise. Clarke’s charge was made entirely of his own volition and was published in a version of the story he chose to make part of the public record.  Now he has an analyst position and is free to cocktail with Peter Jennings and Ted Koppel. Dr. Rice, on the other hand, was asked to respond specifically to Clarke’s characterization of events, and her mention that the heightened alert status never happened is true.  Your suggestion—that the truth here is misleading, because the truth failed to suggest for the TV cameras the larger context beyond the never-issued heightened alerts—is pure spin.

  11. BH says:

    ”…which largely gutted its ability to infiltrate terrorist organizations and gather data from within.”

    Sounds like what happens when you start running the CIA as a feel good enterprise.  Church and Deutch.

    You might think that a pathetic argument but CIA officers got to point loud and clear.

  12. Your links don’t work, Dave.  Try again?

    I especially liked this quote:

    So it’s hard to say what the significance of these errors are,” Hess added. “Whether you agree with him or not, I don’t think anybody has accused Dick Clarke of being sloppy.

    Consider the accusation made.  As much documentation as Clarke had leaving the White House, he apparently neglected to consult it.  Or even research news articles available online.  That, I call sloppy.

  13. Oops, left the quotes off the end.  No one ever accused me of not being sloppy, within hearing range.

  14. capt joe says:

    Does anyone find it in the least bit strange that the architect of the wall between the FBI and CIA that lead to the intel failures is a comission member (Gorelick)?

    Dave has made the statement that Condi lied and now works feverishly backwards to build a case.  Let no uncomfortable fact get in the way!

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